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Comment
Ambulance Chasers Beware: Carley v. Wheeled
Coach and the Questionable Expansion of the
Government Contractor Defense
Jake Thomas Townsend
Mary Carley, an emergency medical technician with the
Virgin Islands Department of Health,' suffered injuries 2 when
the ambulance in which she was riding3 flipped over after it
swerved to avoid colliding with another vehicle.4 Carley subse-
quently filed a strict products liability action against the ambu-
lance manufacturer, Wheeled Coach, in the United States
District Court for the Virgin Islands.5 Wheeled Coach raised the
government contractor defense,6 asserting immunity from liabil-
ity because the corporation manufactured the ambulance pursu-
ant to specifications approved by the United States
government.7 The district court granted Wheeled Coach's sum-
1. In 1988, Mary Carley worked for the Virgin Islands Department of
Health at St. Croix Hospital. Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d
Cir. 1993).
2. Carley suffered injuries to her knees and back, including a herniated
disk, as a result of the collision. Id.
3. At the time of the accident, Carley was on duty, responding to an emer-
gency as a passenger in the 1987 Ford E-350 Type II 6.9 liter diesel-powered
ambulance manufactured by Wheeled Coach, a Florida Corporation. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Carley claimed that the ambulance's excessively high center of
gravity rendered it unreasonably prone to overturn during its intended use. Id.
6. In some circumstances, the government contractor defense shields gov-
ernment suppliers from liability if the defectively-designed product causing in-
jury or damage strictly complies with government-ordered or approved
specifications. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
Federal circuit courts differ on the scope and rationale of the defense. See supra
note 14 (noting circuit split).
7. Wheeled Coach manufactured the ambulance pursuant to a contract
with the United States General Services Administration (GSA). Carley, 991
F.2d at 1118. The parties incorporated the specifications for the ambulance
into the contract. Id. After Wheeled Coach completed the ambulance, a GSA
quality inspector examined the vehicle and concluded that it met the contract
specifications. Id.
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mary judgment motion,s and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed that the government contractor
defense extends to manufacturers of nonmilitary products under
federal common law.9
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corporation'° recognized the government contrac-
tor defense as a matter of federal common law." Under certain
circumstances, the government contractor defense immunizes
contractors who supply military equipment to the government
from the duties imposed by state products liability law.12 The
Boyle decision, however, did not specifically address whether
manufacturers of nonmilitary products can also raise the gov-
ernment contractor defense. 13 This issue has generated a signif-
icant split in authority both before and after Boyle.14 Carley v.
Wheeled Coach illustrates the current controversy over the ap-
8. The District Court of the Virgin Islands exercised its diversity jurisdic-
tion over Carley's suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988). Id. The district
court concluded that under either Virgin Islands law or federal common law,
the government contractor defense applies to nonmilitary contractors and that
Wheeled Coach established the defense as a matter of law. Id.
9. Id. at 1123.
10. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
11. See id. at 511. The Supreme Court established the government con-
tractor defense as a matter of federal common law to preserve federal interests
associated with decision making in federal procurement. Michael D. Green &
Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis: Les-
sons from Boyle's Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 677
(1990).
12. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir.
1992).
13. One major criticism of Boyle stems from the apparent mismatch be-
tween the Court's specific holding, which limited application of the defense to
military contractors, and the federal policy the Court used to justify imposing
federal common law in this area: the government's discretionary function im-
munity. See Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 688-89. The Boyle Court inex-
plicably limited its new federal common-law defense to military procurement.
Id. at 690. Yet, if enhancing government decision-making immunity was the
goal of the defense, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests why this rationale
should not apply to civilian procurement. Id. at 691.
14. Before Boyle, the following opinions held that the government contrac-
tor defense applies to all manufacturers acting on behalf of the government:
Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Burgess v. Colo-
rado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 1359, 1361-62 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1985); McDermott v. Tendun Constructors,
511 A.2d 690, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), cert. denied, 526 A.2d 134
(N.J. 1986). In contrast, some pre-Boyle decisions held that the government
contractor defense applies only to manufacturers of military products: Shaw v.
Grumman Aero Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 743 (11th Cir. 1985); Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp 351, 356-58 (D. Kan. 1983); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 551
F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Haw. 1982).
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propriate scope of the government contractor defense, and in a
broader sense, the role of the courts in products liability re-
form.15 In Carley, the Third Circuit created a whole new class of
defendants who may now share the federal government's immu-
nity from tort liability, thereby frustrating individual state's in-
terests in protecting tort victims 16 and reversing a trend toward
waiver of the government's immunity under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA).17
This Comment explains why precedent and the policies be-
hind Boyle's government contractor defense do not support
wholesale application of the defense to all government contrac-
tors. Part I outlines the origins and development of the modem
After Boyle, courts continued to disagree on whether the government con-
tractor defense is limited to military procurement. The following post-Boyle
opinions held that the government contractor defense applies to all manufactur-
ers: Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212,216-17 (W.D. Wis. 1992); In
re Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818, 823-27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 146
B.R. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Vermeulen v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 204
Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1200-01 (Cal. 1988). Other post-Boyle opinions expressly
limit application of the government contractor defense to manufacturers of mili-
tary products: In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir.
1992); Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452-55 (9th
Cir. 1990); In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339, 348-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
15. Some critics of the Boyle decision point to the Court's institutional in-
adequacy in understanding the complexities of the procurement process rele-
vant to fashioning an appropriate government contractor rule and advocate
Congressional action in this area. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-516 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 715 (arguing that the Court,
given its institutional role and concomitant limitations, cannot absorb and un-
derstand all of the complexities of an appropriate government contractor rule).
Some modem products liability law commentators, however, call on the federal
courts to address the perceived products liability crisis by federalizing products
liability standards, even at the expense of states' rights. See RicHARD NEELY,
Tim PRODuCS LIABIrr CRisis 169 (positing that "[pirobably the best product
liability bill imaginable would simply be a short authorization for the federal
courts to establish a national law of product liability"). With prescient timing,
the Supreme Court announced a new federal common law rule in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), which protects federal military
contractors, under certain conditions, from state tort law liability. See supra
notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
16. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16. (Brennan J., dissenting) (arguing that
the government contractor defense denies injured parties the compensation
that state law assures them). Justice Brennan used a hypothetical situation to
highlight the unfair aspects of the government contractor defense: "Had [the
military contractor] designed such a death trap for a commercial firm, [the in-
jured partys] family could sue under [state] tort law and be compensated for
[the injured party's injuries]." Id. at 515.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946). The government contractor defense expands
the exception to the FTCA's general waiver of federal governmental immunity
by shielding private contractors from state tort liability, under certain condi-
tions. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1992)
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government contractor defense before and after the Boyle deci-
sion. Part II examines of Carley's holding and reasoning. Part
III critique's the Third Circuit's decision in Carley and suggests
an alternative approach to applying the government contractor
defense to nonmilitary contractors. This Comment concludes
that courts should limit the government contractor defense to
procurement of products not readily available on the commercial
market, thereby assuring that courts use the defense to protect
federal interests associated with unique product designs and
state interests in compensating tort victims.
I. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: ITS
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
A. THE TRADITIONAL GovEIRiENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Under certain circumstances, the government contractor de-
fense allows a contractor to share the government's sovereignimmunity from tort liability.' 8 Many courts trace the origins of
the defense to the Supreme Court's decision in Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Construction Co.,19 which held that a third party cannot
recover damages from a duly-authorized contractor executing
the will of the government. 20 Historically, this defense avoided
imposing liability on a contractor for acts properly attributable
to government.21 Because later cases interpreting Yearsley re-
quired contractors to have an actual agency relationship with
18. See Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986)
(describing the rationale behind the government contractor defense as an ex-
tension of sovereign immunity) (citing Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051
(1985)); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985). But see Tozer
v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that the government
contractor defense serves the "historic purpose of not imposing liability on a
contractor who has followed specifications required or approved by the United
States government"); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[t~he [government] contractor defense is avail-
able in certain situations not because a contractor is appropriately held to a
reduced standard of care, nor because it is cloaked with sovereign immunity,
but because traditional separation of powers doctrine compels the defense").
19. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
20. Id. at 21-22. The Supreme Court held that as long as the government
validly conferred authority to carry out the construction project, meaning that
Congress acted within its constitutional powers, the contractor faced no liability
for executing Congress' will. Id. at 20-21.
21. See id. The Yearsley Court found no ground to hold a contractor, as "an
agent or officer of the government," liable for simply acting under the direction
and authority of the United States. Id. at 22. In other words, the law should
not hold the contractor liable for injuries to third parties because "the action of
the agent is [essentially] the 'act of the government,'" and the contractor's lia-
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the United States,22 independent government contractors rarely
shared the federal government's sovereign immunity until the
advent of the modern government contractor defense in the cir-
cuit courts.
2 3
B. SHARED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERAL TORTS
CLAIMs ACT
Sovereign immunity prohibits a private citizen from suing
the federal government without its consent.24 Historically, the
federal government's sovereign immunity shielded its agents
from liability for their tortious acts, forcing injured citizens to
bility should instead be imputed to the government. Id.; see Shaw v. Grumman
Aero. Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739, 740 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985).
22. The Supreme Court's reference to the contractor in Yearsley as an
"agent or officer of the government" indicates that the government contractor
defense required an actual agency relationship with the government. See
Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22 (The action of the agent is the "action of the Govern-
ment."); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 525 (1988) (arguing
that the Yearsley holding depended on an actual agency relationship with the
government) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 (holding that
"W[t]o evaluate a Yearsley claim in the military contractor context" the court
must determine "whether the contractor actually acted as an agent of the gov-
ernment"); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
that "the problem with applying the Yearsley defense in the context of the mili-
tary contractor is the apparent requirement that the contractor possess an ac-
tual agency relationship with the government"); Alex Ferrer, Schoenborn v.
Boeing Co.: The Government Contractor Defense Becomes a "Windfall" for Mili-
tary Contractors, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 287, 290 (1985).
23. The "government agency defense" differs analytically from the modern
government contractor defense. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 739-40. Parties rarely in-
voked the defense because of the difficulty in establishing a government-agent
relationship. Id. at 740; Larry J. Gusman, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technol-
ogies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doc-
trine of the Separation of Powers?, 39 Am. U. L. REv. 391, 414 (1990).
Government contractors who could not establish the government agency de-
fense relied on the closely associated contract specifications defense. This de-
fense-actually a standard of conduct applicable to contractors-provides that
contractors who comply with specifications provided by a third party are not
liable for design defects unless those specifications are so obviously defective
and dangerous that a contractor of reasonable prudence would be put on notice
that the product is likely to cause injury. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563; RESTATE-
MENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965). The contract specifications de-
fense, however, has lost much of its vitality in the context of a modern product
liability action based on strict liability principles. See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563;
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 447 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)) (stating that § 402A strict liability
applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product").
24. Chris Popov, Sovereign Immunity: The Government Contractor's De-
fense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 1989 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 245 n.2.
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seek relief by submitting private bills to Congress. 25 As the fed-
eral government expanded, its wrongs multiplied. The growing
volume of private bills and the mounting demands on congres-
sional resources 26 spurred the government to change the scope
of sovereign immunity.27
In 1946, Congress partially waived the federal government's
immunity from suit by passing the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA).28 According to the United States Supreme Court, the
FTCA signified the "culmination of a long effort to mitigate un-
just consequences of sovereign immunity from suit."2 9 The
FTCA indicates, however, that Congress did not intend to waive
sovereign immunity completely for the tortious conduct of its
agents.30 Section 2680(a) of the FTCA, for example, disallows
waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity with re-
spect to claims based upon the performance of a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agent, regardless of
whether the agent abused discretion.3 1 In the years immedi-
ately following passage of the FTCA, federal circuit courts dis-
agreed on whether the Act should receive a liberal or a strict
construction.3 2
25. WItuLs B. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORTS CLAIM ACT: ANALYZED AND
ANNOTATED 2 (1957). Because the government can only act through its officials
or employees, those who carry out governmental operations also receive immu-
nity under most circumstances. Committee on the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYs GENERAL, SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: THE TORT LiABILY OF GovEmamrNT AND ITs OFFICIALs 9 (1979).
26. See David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Ex-
ception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO
L. REV. 291, 292 (1988).
27. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 15.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946).
29. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
30. The FTCA waives governmental "immunity from recognized causes of
action and [does not] visit the Government with novel and unprecedented liabil-
ities." Id. at 142.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946), commonly referred to as the "discretionary
function" exception, provides as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of the federal agency, or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946)
32. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 7. Compare Jones v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 10, 12 (D.C. 1954) ("Unlike other statutes that submit the United States
to suit, the Federal Torts Claims Act should receive a liberal construction in the
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C. THE FERES-STENCEL DOCTRINE: SAFEGUARDING MILITARY
DECISIONS FROM Tm FTCA
Two United States Supreme Court decisions developed the
Feres-Stencel doctrine by strictly interpreting the FTCA to avoid
undermining the principle of separation of powers.33 In Feres v.
United States,3 4 the Supreme Court held that the FTCA does not
permit suit against the United States for the injuries or death of
Armed Forces personnel in the course of military service.35 Ab-
sent evidence of specific congressional intent to the contrary, the
Court refused to allow state tort law to alter the unique relation-
ship between military personnel and the government-a rela-
tionship which always had been governed exclusively by federal
light of its beneficent purpose.") with Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp.
430, 431 (N.D. Ala. 1949) ("It is elementary that an act of the Legislature which
purports to relinquish the immunity of the sovereign from suit ought to receive
a literal and narrow construction at the hands of the courts.").
33. The Supreme Court was specifically concerned that tort suits by
soldiers would disrupt military discipline and the special relationship between
soldiers and superiors. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954);
Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1985).
34. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
35. Id. at 146. In Feres, Rudolph J. Feres, a United States Army soldier,
died while on active duty as a result of a fire in his barracks. Id. at 137. His
wife, as executrix of his estate, brought an action against the United States,
claiming negligence in quartering Feres in barracks that the Army knew or
should have known were unsafe because of a defective heating plant, and in
failing to maintain a fire watch. Id. The Court first considered whether the
FTCA allowed Feres' claim. The provision which prescribes the test of allowa-
ble claims against the government, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, announces that "[t]he
United States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances." Id. at 141. The Court held that
this provision created no new causes of action, but represented "acceptance of
liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence."
Id. The Court held the government liable only under "all the circumstances," a
standard which considers all the circumstances of the injury, including the sta-
tus of the wronged and wrongdoer. Because no private individual has the au-
thority to conscript or mobilize a private army, the Court could not find
analogous private liability, and therefore the FTCA barred Feres' claim. Id. at
146.
The Court gave two reasons for barring suit by military personnel against
the government under the FTCA. The relationship between the government
and the members of its armed forces is "distinctively federal in character." Id.
at 143. The scope and nature of the legal incidents and consequences of this
relationship, therefore, should be "fundamentally derived from federal sources
and governed by federal authority." Id. at 143-44. In addition, the Court noted
that the absence of any adjustment in the pre-existing statutory system of com-
pensation for injuries and death of those in the armed services, such as Vet-
eran's benefits, is persuasive support for finding no congressional intent to
permit recovery under the FTCA for injuries incident to military service. Id. at
144.
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authority.36 Twenty-seven years later, in Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States,37 the Supreme Court extended the
Feres doctrine and held that third parties cannot seek indemnifi-
cation from the United States for damages paid to injured
soldiers in the course of military duty.38 The Court feared that
third party claims, much like the direct claim at issue in Feres,
would require the United States to indirectly pay what the Vet-
eran's Benefits Act forbids it from directly paying.3 9 Further,
third party claims would require civilian courts to "intervene in
military matters at the possible expense of military discipline
and effectiveness." 40 The Feres-Stencel doctrine thus preserved
military decision-making immunity from the FTCA's general
36. Id. at 143-46. Because no American law prior to the FTCA permitted
soldiers to recover for negligence, either against their superior officers or the
government, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create "a new
cause of action ... for service-connected injuries or death due to negligence."
Id. But see United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 693 (1987) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the plain language of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),
renders the United States liable to all persons, including military personnel,
injured by the negligence of government employees).
37. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
38. Id. at 673-74. The Court barred Stencel's indemnity action for essen-
tially the same reasons that the Court barred the direct claim against the gov-
ernment in Feres. Applying the first Feres rationale, the Stencel Court held
that the government's relationship with its military contractors is no less "dis-
tinctively federal in character" than the relationship between the government
and its soldiers. Id. at 672. In addition, to permit Stencel's claim would also
circumvent the upper limit of liability for the government as to service-con-
nected claims under the Veteran's Benefits Act, thereby "judicially admit[ting]
at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front
door." Id. at 673. Finally, the Court turned to a third rationale, attributed to
Feres but enunciated in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954), rea-
soning that an indemnity suit would "involve second-guessing of military or-
ders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court
as to each other's decisions and actions." Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
39. Id.
40. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1985). Since Stencel,
the Supreme Court recognizes the separation of powers principle as the only
viable factor supporting the Feres-Stencel doctrine. See Shearer v. United
States, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985) (stating that factors mentioned in Feres are
"no longer controlling"); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 742
(11th Cir. 1985) (discussing that the classic separation of powers theory and
military discipline strand of analysis are the only factors surviving Shearer).
Although Stencel holds that government contractors cannot seek indemnity
from the United States for design defect actions brought by injured military
personnel, military suppliers can at least factor this liability risk into their pro-
curement bids. See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674 n.8 (positing that petitioner no
doubt had sufficient notice so as to take this risk into account in negotiating its
contract).
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waiver of sovereign immunity.41 Given the immunities of the
United States under the Feres-Stencel doctrine, federal circuit
courts turned to the question of whether a supplier of military
equipment should directly and immediately shoulder the burden
of the liability to an injured service person.42
D. THE FERES-STENCEL DOCTRINE AS THE BASIS FOR THE
MODERN GovERNMNT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE BEFORE
BoYLE
Federal circuit courts created the government contractor de-
fense 43 as a matter of federal common law44 to preserve the ef-
fectiveness of the government's sovereign immunity under the
Feres-Stencel doctrine.45 The modern government contractor de-
41. See Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 667 (noting that courts ex-
tended Feres to military contractors because, "by failing to do so courts would be
able to second-guess military decision making and, therefore, defeat the modern
justification for Feres").
42. McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. The "government contractor defense," also called the "military contrac-
tor defense," differs analytically from the traditional government contractor de-
fense. See supra notes 22-23. Under certain circumstances, a government
contractor may assert this defense, not under standard of care or agency princi-
ples, but because holding a supplier liable without regard to the extent of gov-
ernment involvement in fixing the product's design and specifications would
subvert the government's immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. Bynum,
770 F.2d at 565; Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertrol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352,
354 (3d. Cir. 1985); McKay, 704 F.2d at 444; Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft
Co., 656 F. Supp 984, 989 (D. Md. 1987). But see Boruski v. United States, 803
F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d
844 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that although most recent decisions limit the gov-
ernment contractor defense to military contracts, "It]he rationale behind the
defense is an extension of sovereign immunity: in circumstances in which the
government would not be liable, private contractors who act pursuant to gov-
ernment directives should not be liable.")); Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 ("The mili-
tary contractor defense is available in certain situations not because a
contractor is appropriately held to a reduced standard of care, nor because it is
cloaked with sovereign immunity, but because traditional separation of powers
doctrine compels the defense.").
44. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 568-71; see Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354 ("It is clear
that federal common law provides a defense to liabilities incurred in the per-
formance of government contracts.").
45. Federal circuit courts feared that permitting state courts to hold gov-
ernment contractors liable for design defects would "undercut the effectiveness
of the immunity that the Feres doctrine was designed to ensure.., since mili-
tary suppliers, despite the government's immunity, would pass the cost of acci-
dents off to the United States through cost overrun provisions in equipment
contracts." Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1453
(9th Cir. 1990); see infra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that passing on
liability costs threatens the government's sovereign immunity under Feres and
Stencel). These courts expressed concern that tort suits, under certain circum-
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fense46 shielded military suppliers from state products liability
actions when the federal government established or approved
reasonably precise design specifications and when the equip-
ment actually conformed to those requirements. 47 A wide vari-
ety of public policy arguments support the defense; the courts
consider these policies sufficiently compelling to deny recovery
even when the plaintiff meets all of the elements of strict liabil-
ity.48 The federal circuit courts collectively identify four major
policy justifications for the defense.
First, the government contractor defense preserves the fed-
eral government's sovereign immunity under the Feres-Stencel
doctrine. 49 A majority of federal circuit courts reason that hold-
ing military contractors liable for design defects in strict prod-
ucts liability actions would subvert the Feres-Stencel doctrine
because military suppliers would pass on the costs of their ad-
ded liability to the government.50 A second supporting policy
stances, would place state courts in the position of "second-guessing" sensitive
military decisions and threatening military discipline by allowing injured ser-
vice people to use products liability actions to question the decisions of their
superiors. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565; see supra note 40 (explaining that separa-
tion of powers concerns compel the military contractor defense).
46. This Comment uses the term "modem government contractor defense"
to distinguish the defense from both the earlier, traditional government con-
tractor defenses and the later government contractor defense as recognized by
the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United States, 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
47. The Ninth Circuit's version of the defense as set forth in McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), also requires the con-
tractor to inform procurement officials about design defects known to the sup-
plier but not to the United States. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th
Cir. 1985). Many circuit courts adopted the McKay test, but other versions of
the modem government contractor defense existed. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 566-67
n.14 (noting that the "Agent Orange" test does not explicitly require application
of the Feres-Stencel doctrine).
48. Commander George E. Hurley, Jr., Government Contractor Liability in
Military Design Defect Cases: The Need for Judicial Intervention, 117 MIL. L.
REv. 219, 229 (1987).
49. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984, 989 (D. Md.
1987) (stating that "the most significant reason supporting the government con-
tract[or] defense is to avoid subverting the underlying policies of governmental
immunity established" by the Feres-Stencel doctrine).
50. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565-66; McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. Both the McKay
dissent and the majority in Shaw v. Grumman Aero. Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th
Cir. 1985), doubted that holding military contractors liable for design defects
would subvert the federal government's immunity under the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine solely because contractors would pass their added liability costs to the
government. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 741-42 ("Wie are not convinced that the
cost pass-through rationale is economically sound."); McKay, 704 F.2d at 457-
58. In Shaw, the Eleventh Circuit refused to adopt the leading version of the
government contractor defense as the Ninth Circuit set forth in McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742. The
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justification for the government contractor defense involved pre-
serving the special relationship of the military to the courts
under the constitutional principle of separation of powers.51 Tri-
als dealing with design defects involving government-supplied
specifications would require courts to do that which Stencel for-
bids: second-guessing military judgments and intervening on
behalf of injured military personnel at the possible expense of
military discipline and effectiveness. 52
A third policy justification for the government contractor de-
fense springs from the reality that the "United States is re-
quired by the exigencies of our defense effort to push technology
towards its limits and thereby to incur risks beyond those that
Shaw majority posited that "to the extent that any competition obtains in the
market for defense products... contractors with defective designs may be de-
terred from passing through the cost of liability for defective design by competi-
tion from contractors with better safety records." Id. at 741-42 (footnotes
omitted).
The Shaw court also reasoned that, "economically sound or not, the cost
pass-through rationale is based on a strained reading of Stencel and an out-
dated interpretation of Feres." Id. Stencel prevented the United States from
indemnifying military contractors who were sued by injured military personnel.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. (discussing the Court's holding in
Stencel). Stencel, however, did allow contractors to pass on their liability insur-
ance costs to the government by internalizing these expenditures in their origi-
nal contract bids. See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674 n.8 (reasoning that because
relationship between military suppliers and the United States was based on a
commercial contract, contractor had sufficient notice to risk not being indemni-
fied by the United States in negotiating its procurement contract). Judge Alar-
con's dissent in McKay pointed out that this reasoning implied that the Court
was aware of Stencel's liability for the design defect, but declined to restrict it
or to preclude it. McKay, 704 F.2d at 457.
51. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 (holding that traditional separation of pow-
ers doctrine compels the defense).
52. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. One court explained its justification of the
military contractor defense:
The purpose of a government contract defense in the context of this
case is to permit the government to wage war in whatever manner the
government deems advisable, and to do so with the support of suppli-
ers of military weapons. Considerations of cost, time of production,
risks to participants, risks to third parties, and any other factors that
might weigh on the decisions of whether, when, and how to use a par-
ticular weapon, are uniquely questions for the military and should be
exempt from review by civilian courts.
Id. at 449-50; In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054
n.1 (1982); In Re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.
1989).
According to the Bynum court, "there are few areas of government activity
in which courts have less competence or that raise such significant separation
of powers concerns." Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565. It is difficult, for example, to
imagine a more purely military matter than the design of a sophisticated jet
fighter aircraft. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986).
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would be acceptable for ordinary consumer goods."53 Without
the government contractor defense, the law might discourage
contractors from cooperating with the government to develop
and produce dangerous but necessary equipment. 54 Simple fair-
ness considerations provide the fourth major policy argument
favoring the government contractor defense: ultimately, a con-
tractor should not face liability for a dangerous design when its
only role in causing the injury to a third party was the produc-
tion of a design supplied by the government. 55
The government contractor defense, in large measure, cre-
ates an incentive for military contractors to produce military
equipment which is inherently dangerous by nature. 56 In apply-
ing the defense, however, federal circuit courts have encoun-
tered problems defining "military equipment." As one court
noted, "the line . . . lies somewhere between an ordinary con-
53. The McKay court discussed that imposing liability on contractors who
federal law compelled to produce a weapon of war without the ability to negoti-
ate specifications, contract prices or terms would unfairly force the supplier into
the "untenable position of choosing to supply products necessary to conduct a
war, and procuring what the government requires but at a contract price that
does not internalize potential liability for design flaws." Id. at 450. Further-
more, product liability law ordinarily deters manufacturers from producing un-
reasonably dangerous products. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965) (discussing strict liability for sellers of products that cause
physical harm). When military equipment is at issue, however, there is a
strong governmental interest in encouraging the military contractor to supply
potentially dangerous products for the government and to comply strictly with
government design specifications. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 572. Military procure-
ment "often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the
balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat-effective-
ness." Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988).
54. See Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 990 (stating that imposing liability on a
government contractor for design defects in military equipment "would have a
chilling effect on businesses willingness to contract with the government and
supply necessary goods and equipment"). Brian Shipp, Torts: Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.: The United States Supreme Court Accepts the Government
Contractor Defense, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 359, 369 (1989). "[Mlany technologically
advanced consumer products are developed despite the fact non-governmental
manufacturers enjoy no immunity from state tort liability." Id. at 369 n.73.
55. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp 984, 990 (D. Md.
1987). The compensation of victims rationale underlying strict liability is less
compelling in the military context because the Veteran's Benefits Act provides a
"swift, efficient remedy" for injured military personnel. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407,
(citing Stencel Aero. Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
56. Application of ordinary tort law to military design and procurement de-
cisions is not appropriate because the exigencies of defense efforts require the
government to "push technology toward its limits and thereby to incur risks
beyond those that would be acceptable for ordinary consumer goods." McKay,
704 F.2d at 449-50.
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sumer product purchased by the armed forces-a can of beans
for example-and the escape system of a Navy RA-5C reconnais-
sance aircraft."57 In 1988, the Supreme Court attempted to re-
solve the circuit court split over the scope of and justification for
the defense by addressing the legitimacy of military contractor
immunity under federal law.
E. BoYzL v. UNITED TEchwoLoGIEs CoR.: THE SuPREME,
COURT RECOGNIZES THE DEFENSE
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,58 the Court consid-
ered whether federal common law necessitated the government
contractor defense. The Court held that a government contrac-
tor's civil liabilities arising out of the performance of a federal
procurement contract involve uniquely federal interests. These
interests are so committed to federal control that federal com-
mon law will preempt and replace state law.5 9
57. Id. at 451.
58. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
59. Id. at 505-06. According to the Boyle majority, civil liabilities of gov-
ernment contractors arising out of the performance of a federal procurement
contract border on two areas that involve uniquely federal interests. First, fed-
eral law governs the rights and obligations of the United States under its con-
tracts. Id. at 504. Although this case "[did] not involve an obligation to the
United States under its contract, but rather liability to third persons," that lia-
bility still "[arose] out of performance of the contract." Id. at 505. In addition,
the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty
implicates uniquely federal interests as well. Id. Although Boyle involved "an
independent contractor performing its obligation under a procurement contract,
rather than an official performing his duty as a federal employee," the case im-
plicated the same interest in getting the government's work done. Id.
To support its finding of a federal interest in procurement contracts as well
as performance contracts, the Court cited Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309
U.S. 18 (1940), in which the Court "rejected an attempt by a landowner to hold
a construction contractor liable under state law for the erosion of 95 acres
caused by the contractor's work in constructing dikes for the Government."
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506. The majority reasoned that although the suit involved
private parties, the imposition of liability on government contractors would di-
rectly impact the terms of government contracts, either through higher contract
prices or by creating a disincentive for suppliers to manufacture the product
specified by the government. Id. at 506-07.
The Boyle dissent and products liability law commentators claim that there
are serious flaws in the majority's federal common-law analysis. Green &
Matasar, supra note 11, at 644; see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519 ("[O]ur power to
create federal common law controlling the Federal government's contractual
rights and obligations does not translate into a power to prescribe rules that
cover all transactions or contractual relationships collateral to government con-
tracts.") (Brennan, J., dissenting). One major criticism of the majority's com-
mon law analysis is that it "needlessly tries to shoehorn the government
contractor defense into existing federal common-law precedents." Green &
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The exclusive federal interest in the procurement of equip-
ment by the United States, however, "merely establishes a nec-
essary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state
law."60 Consequently, the Court held that before federal law
displaces state tort law in a products liability action involving
an alleged design defect, courts must determine that a "signifi-
cant conflict" exists between the federal interests associated
with government procurement contracts and the operation of
state law.61
The Boyle Court rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as a via-
ble approach to identifying state claims against government con-
tractors which raise a "significant conflict" with federal interests
in the context of federal procurement.62 The Feres-Stencel doc-
trine immunizes the contractor from tort liability for injuries
suffered by military personnel in situations in which the mili-
Matasar, supra note 11, at 644. "Neither government employee immunity nor
the government contract cases is sufficient to justify a federal government con-
tractor common-law defense." Id. at 646-47. As the dissent points out and as
the majority acknowledges, Boyle presented "simply a suit between two private
parties. [This Court has] steadfastly declined to impose federal [common] law
on relationships that are collateral to a federal contract, or to extend the federal
employee's immunity beyond federal employees." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); see Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 657-660 (arguing
that Boyle's analysis distinguishing prior private party cases is unconvincing on
the basis that those cases involved effects on federal interests too speculative to
warrant extension of federal common law, but Boyle does not).
60. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. The Court disregards the distinction between
preempting state law and the displacement of federal-law reference to state law
for the rule of decision, claiming there is no practical consequence. See id. at
507 n.3. As a result, the Court's analysis allows no room for weighing the costs
to federal and state relations and for consideration of whether the less restric-
tive alternative of borrowing state law might preserve federal interests. See
Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 676-83; Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518 ("State laws
'should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial
interests of the National government, which cannot be served consistently with
respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if state law is ap-
plied.'") (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. The Court defines "significant conflict" by ex-
ample, as one where a state-imposed duty of care precisely contradicts the duty
imposed by the government contract. Id. at 509. In other words, "the fact that
the area in question is of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise
be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can." Id. at 507-08.
62. Id. at 509-10. The Boyle Court rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as
both overprotective and underprotective of federal interests associated with
military procurement contracts. Id. at 510. By adopting the FTCA's discretion-
ary function exception as the proper basis for the government contractor de-
fense, the Court aimed at protecting the federal interest in preserving the
governments discretion to balance safety and performance needs. See id. at
511; infra text accompanying note 68; Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 669-
70, 683.
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tary had merely ordered standard military equipment and had
exercised no judgment at all in the design specifications. 63 At
the same time, the Feres-Stencel doctrine arbitrarily limits the
government's immunity to suits brought by military personnel
against the federal government.64 If the Feres-Stencel doctrine
forbids military personnel from challenging military decisions
through tort actions against contractors, it makes little sense to
permit civilian plaintiffs to use state tort law to effect the same
result.65
In place of the Feres-Stencel doctrine, the Boyle Court relied
on the discretionary function exception to the FTCA66 to deter-
mine when a "significant conflict" exists between federal inter-
ests and state law in the context of government procurement.6 7
63. The government contractor defense, under a Feres doctrine rationale,
would prevent suit against the government for products that the government
purchased as well as designed. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
64. Id. at 510-11; see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (noting that
Feres-Stencel applies only to direct or indemnity claims of injured military
personnel).
65. Id. at 511. The manufacturer of an allegedly defective fighter plane, for
example cannot invoke the Feres doctrine to prevent a suit in which a civilian
claims wrongful death to his or her decedent resulting from injuries arising out
of the alleged defect. See id. at 510-11.
66. See supra notes 30-31 (discussing the FTCA).
67. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The purpose of
the discretionary function exception is "to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and polit-
ical policy through the medium" of a tort suit. Fishback & Killefer, supra note
26, at 298 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)). The Court defined the
"discretionary fumction or duty" that cannot form the basis for suit under the
FTCA as follows: "[wihere there is room for policy judgment and decision there
is discretion." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953). The discretion-
ary function exception does not apply to ordinary or "run-of-the-mill" accidents,
which involve no policy considerations. Fishback & Killefer, supra note 26, at
299. Yet, the discretionary function exception applies if the accident could be
traced back to when a policy decision was made or susceptible of being made.
Id. Thus, the discretionary function exception protected the Army's failure to
place warning labels on an explosive product, even if the Army failed to con-
sider the policy pros and cons of applying labels to these products. Id. at 299
n.51.
The Court's reliance on the discretionary function exception to suggest the
outlines of "significant conflict" between federal interests and state law creates
unintended results. Boyle requires that the government consciously consider
reasonably precise design specifications for the government contractor defense
to apply. See supra note 70 (describing Boyle's adoption of the McKay three-
prong test for determining when to displace state tort law). The government
may have inadvertently omitted the challenged design defects from the specifi-
cations, indicating that federal procurement officials may never have made a
policy judgment with respect to that particular design defect. Matasar &
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The Boyle Court stated that the federal government's selection
of the appropriate design for military equipment amounts to a
discretionary function within the meaning of the discretionary
function exception: it involves "not only engineering analysis
but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military,
and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-
off between greater safety and greater combat-effectiveness. 68
To permit state courts to second-guess these military judgments
through state tort suits, Boyle reasoned, would unduly impinge
on the military's decision-making process, by allowing contrac-
tors to pass on their added liability costs to the federal govern-
ment.69 State laws that hold government contractors liable for
design defects in military equipment, therefore, produce a "sig-
nificant conflict" with federal policy under some circumstances
and must be preempted.70
F. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT INVOLVING APPLICABILITY OF THE
DEFENSE TO NON-MILITARY CONTRACTORS
After Boyle, federal circuit courts have been unable to agree
on whether the government contractor defense applies exclu-
sively to military procurement contracts. 71 In Johnson v. Grum-
man Corp.,7 2 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin held that the government contractor de-
fense, as announced in Boyle, applies to all government procure-
ment, including nonmilitary contracts.7 3 Although the Boyle
Green, supra note 11, at 692. In this case, Boyle operates to immunize contrac-
tors from liability for design defects that are not deliberately considered by gov-
ernment procurement officers. Id. at 693.
68. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
69. See id. at 511-12; In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 811
(9th Cir. 1992).
70. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The Boyle Court adopted McKay's three-pro-
nged test to limit the scope of state tort law displacement to instances in which
a government officer considered the challenged design feature. Id. at 512.
Under the McKay text, courts cannot impose state tort liability for design de-
fects in military equipment when, "(1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." Id.
71. See supra note 14 (noting the post-Boyle circuit split).
72. 806 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
73. Id. at 217. The Johnson court considered whether the government con-
tractor defense extended to an alleged design defect in the manufacture of
United States Postal Service vehicles. Id. at 216. The Johnson court cited a
pre-Boyle decision that applied the government contractor defense to a civilian
setting. Id. In Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986),
the Seventh Circuit extended the government contractor defense to a civilian
1560
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opinion contained language such as "military contractor" and
"military equipment" instead of the broader "government con-
tractor" and "government procurement," Johnson interpreted
Boyle's reliance on the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA to apply in both civilian and military contexts. 74 The
court in Johnson concluded that both civilian and military sup-
pliers can invoke the defense as long as they satisfy each ele-
ment of the government contractor defense set forth in Boyle.75
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Nielsen v. George Diamond
Vogel Paint Co.,76 held that only military contractors can invoke
the defense.7 7 Although Boyle recognized that uniquely federal
interests inhere in the potential liabilities that arise out of all
government contracts, regardless of their military or civilian na-
ture,78 Nielsen placed great reliance on the Boyle majority's fo-
cus on the military context of that case in defining where a
drug manufacturer who had developed a defective vaccine. Id. Boruski, relying
on another pre-Boyle decision extending the defense to civilian manufacturers,
stated that "[t]he rationale behind the [government contractor] defense is an
extension of sovereign immunity: in circumstances in which the government
would not be liable, private contractors who act pursuant to government direc-
tives should not be liable." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burgess v.
Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985)). Both the Burgess and
the Boruski courts, however, applied state law versions of the government con-
tractor defense. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1130 n.2 (3d Cir.
1993). Thus, these courts did not face the same federal common law analysis
involved in formulating new federal common-law rules to displace state law.
Id. at 1130 n.2; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (explaining the
Boyle court's resolution of the government contractor defense and federal com-
mon law).
74. Johnson, 806 F. Supp. at 217.
75. Id. Johnson's holding rests on finding no conflict between the scope of
the defense in Boruski and the subsequent Boyle decision. Id.
76. 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
77. See id. at 1454. Ronald Nielsen, a civilian employee of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, painted a dam in Idaho over the course of
many years. Id. at 1451. Nielsen sued the manufacturer of the paint he used in
the course of his job, claiming that many years of inhaling the paint caused
permanent brain damage. Id. The district court granted the defendant, George
Diamond Vogel Paint Co., summary judgment under Idaho law, using the con-
tract specifications defense. Id. Nielsen appealed, claiming that the district
court erred in finding that the contract specifications defense applies to defend-
ants as a matter of Idaho law. Id. at 1452. Following the district court's ruling,
and before Nielsen's appeal, the United States announced its decision in Boyle
v. United Technologies, 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Id. at 1453. Defendants then
urged on appeal that they were entitled judgment as a matter of federal, and
not state law, and that the Ninth Circuit need not reach any of appellant's con-
tentions with regard to Idaho law. Id.
78. See id. at 1454; see supra text accompanying note 60 (describing the
limits of the unique federal interests).
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"significant conflict" exists between federal and state law.79
Thus, Nielsen held that applying state tort liability to a nonmili-
tary contractor raises no significant conflict with federal policy
requiring the preemption of a state law.80 The Nielsen court did
not interpret Boyle to require that nonmilitary contractors "en-
joy an immunity from tort liability as a matter of federal law
that they did not enjoy before Boyle."8 '
II. CARLEY v. WHEELED COACH
On September 2, 1988, Mary Carley, an emergency medical
technician, was on duty and riding as a passenger of an ambu-
lance manufactured by Wheeled Coach, a Florida corporation.8 2
While en route to the scene of an emergency, the ambulance
flipped over as it swerved to avoid a car that failed to properly
yield the right-of-way.8 3 As a result, Mary Carley injured her
knees and back.8 4 Wheeled Coach manufactured the ambulance
pursuant to a contract with the United States General Services
Administration (GSA).8 5
79. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1454-55.
80. Id. at 1455; see also In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806,
811 (9th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that state tort liability would not unduly impinge
on the military's decision-making process with respect to products "readily
available on the commercial market"). In In Re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases,
the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Boyle's government contractor defense to
asbestos manufacturers because the insulation "does not represent military
equipment entitling its manufacturers to the protections of the [government]
contractor defense." Id. at 812. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Boyle as limiting
the defense to procurement of products "ordered by the military [that were not]
readily available, in substantially similar form, to commercial users..." Id. at
811.
81. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1455.
82. Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. Id. A police officer witnessing the accident reported that the ambulance
driver operated the vehicle in a "reasonable and safe manner for an emergency
situation." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1125. "The General Services Administration solicited bids for the
construction of an ambulance pursuant to the terms of GSA Solicitation No.
FCAP-X6-70785-N-12-9-86." Id. The GSA's solicitation required that the am-
bulance comply with the Federal Specifications for the "Star-of Life Ambu-
lance," KKK-A-1822B, dated June 1, 1985, as specified in the contract. Id. The
procurement contract specified that Wheeled Coach locate the ambulance's
center of gravity, making sure that it complied with the center of gravity pa-
rameters set by the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company. Id. Ford's guidelines
for an incomplete 1987 E-350 6.9 liter diesel van chassis state "that the vertical
distance from the ground to the completed vehicle center of gravity should not
exceed 43 inches for vehicles equal to or greater than 8,000 pounds." Id. After
Wheeled Coach built the ambulance in question, a GSA quality assurance in-
spector examined it, and found it in compliance with contract specifications. Id.
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On April 4, 1989, Carley filed a strict products liability suit
against Wheeled Coach in the District Court of the Virgin Is-
lands. 6 Wheeled Coach affirmatively raised the government
contractor defense, 7 and moved for summary judgment. 8 The
district court granted the motion, concluding that under both
federal common law and Virgin Islands law, the government
contractor defense applied to nonmilitary procurement.8 9 Car-
ley appealed to the Third Circuit and that court affirmed the
summary judgment, holding that the government contractor de-
fense, as formulated in Boyle, applies to manufacturers of non-
military products as a matter of federal common law.90
The Carley court considered Boyle's express rejection of the
Feres-Stencel doctrine and its reliance instead on the discretion-
ary function exception to the FTCA as the strongest reasons for
applying the defense to all government contractors. 91 Carley
noted that although federal government contracts for nonmili-
at 1126. Robert Carlton, mechanical engineering supervisor for Wheeled
Coach, stated that Wheeled Coach manufactured the ambulance according to
government specifications and that after testing and measuring the vehicle, the
center of gravity measured 36.5 inches above the ground, well within the gov-
ernment's requirement that it be under 43 inches. Id.
86. Id. at 1118. Carley alleged that "the ambulance was unreasonably
prone to turn over during its intended use because of an excessively high center
of gravity." Id.
87. Wheeled Coach claimed immunity from liability under the government
contractor defense because it built the ambulance in the performance of its obli-
gations under a contract with the United States government. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1125. Carley moved for reconsideration on the grounds that Flor-
ida law applied, and that Florida does not recognize a government contractor
defense for nonmilitary contractors. Id. at 1128. The Third Circuits holding,
however, makes the government contractor defense available as a matter of fed-
eral common law. Carley's conflict of laws question, therefore, remained unde-
cided on remand in order to determine whether Wheeled Coach would be able to
establish the federal government contractor defense. Id. at 1128 n.7.
On appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the case, concluding that Wheeled
Coach failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to the third prong of the defense. Id. at 1127-28. This third element, as
set forth by the Supreme Court in Boyle, requires a supplier to warn the United
States about dangers in the use of its product that were known to the supplier
but unknown to the United States. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). Although
Wheeled Coach offered evidence sufficient to satisfy the first two prongs of the
three-part test, the corporation produced no evidence on record "showing that
Wheeled Coach warned the GSA about dangers in its ambulance that were
known to Wheeled Coach but not to the GSA." Carley, 991 F.2d at 1126.
91. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120. Because the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA indicates the scope of the defense, Carley had to determine
whether the procurement of a nonmilitary product with known safety risks in-
volves a discretionary function as well. Id. at 1122.
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tary products do not involve considerations of combat effective-
ness, the policy considerations cited by Boyle for determining
whether the Armed Forces have exercised a discretionary func-
tion apply equally to military and nonmilitary procurement.92
When the federal government balances safety concerns against
technical and social considerations in nonmilitary procurement,
the government exercises its discretionary function and the gov-
ernment contractor defense extends to protect these federal pol-
icy decisions. 93
III. BOYLE'S GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
SUPPORTS ONLY LIMITED APPLICATION TO
CIVILIAN PROCUREMENT
The Carley decision drastically alters the scope of Boyle's
government contractor defense by extending coverage to all non-
military contractors as well as to military suppliers. Carley's
sweeping holding invites criticism for encroaching on the do-
main of Congress as the nation's sole law maker,94 and for frus-
trating state's interests in compensating tort victims. 95 Boyle's
government contractor defense should be properly limited to the
procurement of products that are not readily available in the
commercial market.
92. Id. at 1121. But see supra note 62 (noting that government's selection
of military equipment amounts to a discretionary function because it specifi-
cally involves the "tradeoff between greater safety and greater combat-effective-
ness). Carley dismissed the dissent's claim that Boyle "soundly establishes that
the government contractor defense is premised on concerns unique to the mili-
tary." Carley, 991 F.2d at 1121 n.3. The Carley majority claimed that the lan-
guage and examples in Boyle illustrate that concerns about combat
effectiveness were on an equal footing with other policies, such as engineering
analysis, technical, and social considerations. Id. at 1122 n.3.
93. Id. at 1123. Carley held that the federal government's use of its discre-
tionary function, not the product's military or nonmilitary nature, determines
the appropriateness of the government contractor defense. Id. at 1124.
94. Justice Brennan's dissent in Boyle applies equally to Carley's new rule
of federal common law. He argues: "The Court-unelected and unaccountable
to the people-has unabashedly stepped into the breach to legislate a rule deny-
ing [Mary Carley] the compensation that state law assures [her]." Boyle, 487
U.S. at 515-16. Congress has considered but has never legislated a federal gov-
ernment contractor defense. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1133 n.7.
95. See id. at 1128 (Becker, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's ex-
tension of Boyle impinges on the domain of Congress and that of the states).
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A. MOST CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR LIABILITY CREATES No
"SIGNIFICANT CONFLIcT WiTi FEDERAL INTERESTS
The Carley decision misreads Boyle, ignoring its explicit
language and reasoning by expanding the government contrac-
tor defense to cover all federal procurement. Justice Scalia,
speaking for the Boyle majority, narrowly framed the issue by
using specific terms: when can "a contractor providing military
equipment to the Federal Government... be held liable under
state tort law for injury caused by a design defect."96 The Boyle
Court repeatedly described the government contractor defense
in terms that limit it to those who supply military equipment to
the federal government.97 Throughout the opinion, Justice
Scalia used terms such as "military equipment" and the "mili-
tary contractor defense" to describe the scope and nature of the
defense.98
Carley dismissed Boyle's specific holding as merely answer-
ing the narrow question before the Court rather than foreclosing
the possibility of a government contractor defense for all nonmil-
itary contractors. 99 Carley reached this conclusion by incor-
rectly applying Boyle's common-law analysis. Boyle held that
before a court applies state tort law in a products liability action
involving the government contractor defense, it must determine
whether state law "significantly conflicts" with an identifiable
federal policy or interest associated with the federal procure-
ment contract. 100 The Boyle majority focused on the federal gov-
ernment's interest in preserving its discretionary functionimmunity as the limiting principle for identifying situations in
which a significant conflict arises requiring the displacement of
state law.' 01 Carley, however, misread Boyle in its finding of a
"significant conflict" whenever the federal government exercises
discretion in procuring a nonmilitary product with the aware-
96. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
97. For example, the Court reasoned "that state law which holds govern-
ment contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some
circumstances present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be
displaced." Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
98. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502, 511-12; see In Re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases,
960 F.2d 806, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1124-25.
100. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text
(rejecting the federal government's interest in preserving its immunity under
the Feres-Stencel doctrine as an appropriate limiting principle because it is both




ness of its dangers.10 2 Boyle did not go that far.'0 3 Rather,
Boyle held that a government contractor's state tort liability
presents a "significant conflict" with the federal government's
discretionary function immunity only in some circumstances. 0 4
The Carley court correctly concluded that Boyle's three-pro-
nged test specifically distinguishes military procurement con-
tracts which involve the particular type of governmental
discretionary functions that Boyle sought to protect in the mili-
tary context, from those which it did not.10 5 The Boyle Court,
however, adopted this test as the appropriate scope of state law
displacement in the military procurement context.10 6 A military
contractor's state tort liability is very likely to "significantly con-
flict" with the federal government's discretionary function im-
munity when military contractors either withdraw from the
procurement market or pass on their added liability to the gov-
ernment through higher contract prices, producing the same ef-
fect sought to be avoided by the FTCA. 10 7 This assumption is
questionable in the area of civilian procurement.
In Carley, the Third Circuit posited that two factors contrib-
ute to substantial interference with the federal government's
discretionary function immunity if state tort liability is imposed
on the civilian contractor. The court reasoned that imposing lia-
bility on government contractors for design defects in govern-
ment-ordered equipment will directly affect the terms of
government contracts: contractors will either pass on the finan-
102. See Carley, 991 F.2d at 1122 (concluding that the government performs
a discretionary function whenever it procures a nonmilitary product with an
awareness of its dangers).
103. Although Boyle adopted the discretionary function exception as the ba-
sis for the contractor defense, the defense does not apply whenever the govern-
ment exercises its discretionary function immunity in the federal procurement
context. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (distinguishing discretionary
functions protected by Boyle from those unprotected).
104. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. In other words, the integrity of the federal gov-
ernnent's discretionary function immunity is threatened, in some circum-
stances, when state law holds the contractor liable for design defects in
federally procured equipment. These circumstances only include instances in
which contractors are likely to pass the financial burden of their state tort judg-
ments onto the United States despite the government's immunity from the tor-
tious effect of its policy judgments. See id.
105. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1124. But see supra note 67 (arguing reliance on
FTCA's discretionary function exception as the basis for the defense creates un-
intended results).
106. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (adopting the Ninth Circuit's McKay test,
which the circuit developed for military contractors, as the appropriate scope of
displacement for design defects in military equipment).
107. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
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cial burden of state tort law judgments to the United States to
cover contingent liability costs, or will decline to manufacture
designs specified by the government.108 The Boyle Court articu-
lated this concern, however, only to support its preliminary con-
clusion that uniquely federal interests in potential civil
liabilities arise out of the performance of all federal procurement
contracts.10 9 The Court in Boyle was concerned that passing lia-
bility costs for design defects from military contractors to the
government would substantially interfere with highly sensitive
military decisions and would disturb the delicate balance be-
tween equipment safety and combat effectiveness.110 These
same problems do not exist for products readily available on the
commercial market. Usually, such products "have been devel-
oped in response to the broader needs and desires of end-users
in the private sector." 11' Civilian contractors generally will not
change their marketing behavior or pricing because they do not
enjoy immunity from tort liability with respect to the goods sold
to one of their customers, the federal government.112
In addition, Carley reasoned that state tort law will em-
power authorities to "second-guess" and significantly interfere
with federal policy decisions respecting the design of products
for use in civilian projects unless nonmilitary contractors have
immunity for design defects." 3 This assumption, however,
holds true only when a government contractor's collateral liabil-
ity to an injured third party impinges on the federal govern-
ment's decision making by forcing the contractor to either raise
its product prices or withdraw from the procurement market.
114
Unlike the modern government contractor defense cases, courts
have little reason to fear that civilian contractors will refuse to
manufacture most products for the federal government if state
108. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120.
109. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506; supra note 59 and accompanying text. The
sole dissenter on the Carley court, Judge Becker, states that the majority's cost
theory proves too much because liability costs are factored into the price of all
products sold to the federal government. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1132. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's Stencel decision implicitly endorsed the practice of factoring
potential liability costs into procurement contracts. See Stencel Aero Eng'r
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977); supra notes 40, 50.
110. See supra note 62.
111. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
112. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.
1992).
113. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1122.
114. See supra note 103; supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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courts "second-guess" their product designs."15 To the extent
that market forces bear on the civilian procurement sector, state
tort liability and competitive bidding encourages nonmilitary
contractors to keep their contract prices low by producing safer
designs. 116 Therefore, holding nonmilitary contractors liable for
design defects under state law, in some circumstances, fails to
"significantly conflict" with the federal government's discretion-
ary function immunity.
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEMONSTRATES A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE BOYLE DEFENSE
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Nielsen v. George Diamond
Vogel Paint Co.," 7 offers a more coherent view of Boyle's govern-
ment contractor defense as applied to civilian procurement con-
tracts. Nielsen addresses whether a contractor who
manufactured paint according to federal specifications can in-
voke Boyle's defense.118 Although Nielsen conceded that Boyle's
underlying premise applies to all government contracts, the
court stated that Boyle does not require civilian contractors to
"enjoy an immunity from tort liability as a matter of federal law
that they did not enjoy before Boyle."" 9 According to the Niel-
sen court, the policy behind Boyle remains "rooted in considera-
tions peculiar to the military."120  Thus, a government
contractor's state law liability, in most instances, fails to raise a
significant conflict with the federal government's discretionary
function immunity.1 1
115. Whether contractors will withdraw from the federal procurement mar-
ket depends on "how significant their liability exposure is in relationship to
suppliers' profits. These are crucial questions in analyzing the impact of a con-
tractor defense on the health of the supplier market, but they are also questions
beyond the competence of the Court to explore and assess." Green & Matasar,
supra note 11, at 717. The Carley court nowhere discussed whether or how the
GSA exercised its policy judgment immunity by incorporating the defective
center of gravity specifications set by Ford Motor Co. into the procurement con-
tract. See supra note 85.
116. See McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 457 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Alarcon, J. dissenting).
117. 892 F.2d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Nielsen
decision).
119. Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1455.
120. Id. at 1454-55.
121. See id. at 1455 ("Under Boyle, we can find no reason to hold that appli-
cation of state law would create a 'significant conflict' with federal policy requir-
ing a displacement of state law.").
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C. EXTENDING BOYLE TO ALL CIVILIAN PROCUREMENT
FRUSTRATES PUBLIC PoLicY
The Third Circuit's decision in Carley uses Boyle as a
springboard to create a sweeping new rule of federal common
law. In so doing, the court creates bad policy and frustrates in-
dividual state's interests in compensating its tort victims. 12 2
The policy justifications supporting the government contractor
defense in the military procurement context do not wholly apply
to nonmilitary contractors. Strict liability usually vindicates the
reasonable expectations of consumers that the products they
utilize are not unreasonably dangerous. 123 Military personnel,
however, recognize exposure to danger as an immutable feature
of their profession. 124 Moreover, the potential users of federally-
procured civilian equipment usually do not voluntarily expose
themselves to high risks or grave dangers as military personnel
do. The government contractor defense, as applied in Carley,
works an injustice on unsuspecting civilians and broadens the
exception to the FTCA's general waiver of federal immunity by
withdrawing a remedy from those who deserve protection.' 25
Strict liability also provides a remedy for victims of defec-
tive products. 126 The military's generous compensation scheme
under the Veteran's Benefits Act at least partially mitigates the
unfairness of military contractor immunity. 27 Although the
122. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1128 (Becker, J., dissenting); see supra notes 15-17
and accompanying text.
123. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 572 (5th Cir. 1985); see RESTATE-
AnENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment i (1965) (defining an "unreasonably
dangerous" product as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary com-
mon knowledge to the community as to its characteristics").
124. To regard members of the Armed Forces as ordinary consumers "would
demean and dishonor the high station in public esteem to which, because of
their exposure to danger, they are justly entitled." Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d
402, 407 (4th Cir. 1986).
125. The FTCA waives all immunity from recognized causes of action, it
does not withdraw remedies from those who once had one. See supra notes 28-
32 and accompanying text (explaining scope and nature of the FTCA).
126. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965) (stating
that "public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and
be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained...").
127. See supra notes 35, 55 (describing that Veteran's Benefits Act benefits
provided to injured military personnel in the course of military service); see also
Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that appellant, a federal civilian employee, received partial compensa-
tion for his injuries under the Federal Employee Compensation Act).
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Boyle defense leaves civilian plaintiffs with no alternative com-
pensation, countervailing separation of powers concerns prevent
courts from second-guessing military decisions. 128 Nonmilitary
contractor immunity, in most circumstances, will return the na-
tion to the pre-FTCA era by forcing some injured citizens to
lobby Congress for relief from the unjust consequences of the
government contractor's shared immunity from tort liability.129
Civilian contractor immunity also externalizes the deter-
rent function of strict liability by reducing the incentive to mar-
ket safe products. 130 Furthermore, contractors that successfully
sell goods to both the government and commercial markets may
turn their immunity into a competitive advantage over their ri-
vals in the private market by reflecting their lower liability costs
through lower product prices on the commercial market. As a
result, government contractor immunity will somewhat subsi-
dize the competitive advantage of larger manufacturers, who
have the resources to supply both commercial and government
markets, over smaller commercial contractors.
D. Bozs DEFENSE SHOULD ONLY EXTEND TO PRODUCTS
NOT READILY AvAIAiBE IN THE COMMERCIAL MARKET
Although the Third Circuit's decision in Carley extended
Boyle far beyond its logical limits, the Boyle decision supports
limited application of the defense to civilian procurement. Boyle
arguably permits all government contractors to invoke the de-
fense, as long as the operation of state law in federal procure-
ment contracts creates a "significant conflict" with federal
interests in preserving the government's discretionary function
immunity.' - ' In the military context, "significant conflict" oc-
curs whenever the military makes highly complex and sensitive
decisions regarding the development of new military equipment.
A significant conflict may also arise when contractors begin to
withdraw from government procurement or significantly raise
their prices to insure against their potential liability for the gov-
128. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (noting separation of
powers concerns and judicial competence warrant the contractor defense).
129. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the FTCA was
designed to mitigate the unjust consequences of the federal governments sover-
eign immunity from suit).
130. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,452 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A
second reason for imposing strict liability is to deter manufacturers from mar-
keting unsafe products by encouraging the use of cost-justified safety
features.").
131. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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ernment's designs.13 2 When this happens, Boyle's federal com-
mon law defense displaces state tort law to protect the federal
interests in preserving integrity of the government's decision-
making immunity under the FTCA.133
Most government procurement in the civilian context fails
to raise this "significant conflict" because contractors develop
most products in response to the broader needs and desires of
the end-users in the private sector.134 The government procures
ambulances, paint and other civilian products commonly avail-
able in the commercial market, without the highly complex level
of decision making that goes into military procurement, in which
the government balances national security against product
safety.135 In Carley, for example, the government supplied spec-
ifications merely incorporated the center of gravity specifica-
tions set by Ford Motor Co.: a specification set by a private
manufacturer for all vehicles of that same class. In Nielsen v.
George Diamond Vogel Paint Co.,13 6 the Army Corps of Engi-
neers procured allegedly defective paint products without any
special military purpose in mind.137 As the Ninth Circuit noted
in that decision, applying state law would not significantly inter-
fere with any uniquely federal interest.138  In addition, Boyle's
rejection of Feres as the triggering mechanism, in favor of the
discretionary function, clearly indicated that the government
contractor defense did not apply to stock or standard equipment
132. See supra note 114.
133. See Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 683.
134. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
135. No other case better evidences this than Carley. Carley expanded
Boyle's contractor defense to protect the GSA's decision to incorporate the
center-of-gravity specifications supplied by Ford Motor Co. into its procurement
contract with Wheeled Coach. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. This
is hardly the level of discretionary function decision making that Boyle in-
tended to protect. See supra note 62. But see supra note 67 (Boyle creates unin-
tended consequences in relying on the FTCA as a basis for the defense). Carley
expands the reach of Boyle's common law defense based on a dubious assump-
tion that holding Wheeled Coach liable under state tort law will significantly
conflict with the GSA's discretionary function immunity.
The federal government procures some civilian products-such as NASA's
space shuttle-with careful attention the needs and desires of the ultimate end-
user in mind, and state law will substantially interfere with the government's
discretionary function immunity in this instance if liability forces NASA con-
tractors to withdraw from the federal procurement market or raise their prices.
See supra note 103.
136. 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 1455 (noting that this case involved a "product designed to fur-
ther civilian rather than military objectives").
138. Id.
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purchased by the government.13 9 Fashioning the appropriate
scope for the government contractor defense requires a far
greater understanding of the procurement process than the
courts can institutionally command. 140 Carley's government con-
tractor defense envisions a model of government procurement
that may not reflect reality. The way in which contractor liabil-
ity would inhibit the decision making of government contracting
officials remains difficult to assess.141 The infrequency of con-
tractual indemnification also suggests that liability costs do not
powerfully influence suppliers' willingness to participate in the
market.142
In addition, the Carley defense assumes that the govern-
ment makes design decisions involving the trade-off between
product safety and special matters of public policy. Most gov-
ernment procurement involves design decisions based on stan-
dard risk-benefit decisions and may not implicate policy
judgments the government's discretionary function immunity
was intended to protect. 143 Furthermore, the Carley defense as-
sumes that federal procurement officials scrupulously review all
design specifications submitted to the government for approval.
Instead, officials make many design decisions implicating prod-
uct safety without serious review. Government can more effi-
ciently obtain the requisite product safety it desires by imposing
liability on the contractors rather than by relying on govern-
ment employees to critically review design specifications.' 44
Congress has the institutional capacity to test these procure-
ment assumptions and to balance end-user expectations against
protection of the federal interests associated with discretionary
function immunity. 145
Carley's new rule of federal common law unnecessarily up-
sets federal and state relations by withdrawing strict liability
remedies from a whole new class of citizens, without a strong
139. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
140. The Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, as well as the Third Circuit's
opinion in Carley, bases a federal common-law defense on the assumption that
in the absence of contractor immunity, increased costs to government will harm
government decision making. See Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 660.
Boyle fails to explain why the effect of increased liability costs on other private
party cases is speculative while the present case presents a "significant conflict"
with federal interests in decision making. Id.
141. See Green & Matasar, supra note 11, at 716-17.
142. Id. at 718 n.297.
143. See id. at 718, 718 n.300.
144. Id. at 718.
145. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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showing that federal interests will suffer major damage if courts
apply state law.146 Carley's defense reverses the historical trend
favoring waiver of the government's sovereign immunity, and
does so without really understanding the complexities of govern-
ment procurement. Before federal courts create a new doctrine
"to answer 'questions of policy on which Congress has not spo-
ken', [they] have a special duty to identify the proper deci-
sionmaker before trying to make the proper decision." 147
CONCLUSION
Carley misread the Boyle decision to create a new rule of
federal common law which, in turn, frustrates public policy by
withdrawing firmly established state tort law remedies and ex-
panding the scope of the federal government's immunity under
the FTCA. Carley failed to demonstrate how imposing tort lia-
bility on an ambulance manufacturer for alleged design defects
significantly impedes federal policymaking immunity other than
by potentially transferring an undetermined amount of tort lia-
bility costs onto the government. Congress has the superior in-
stitutional capacity to test policy assumptions in support of
government contractor immunity and to define the protected
scope of federal policymaking authority, as it did with the FTCA.
Meanwhile, courts should limit the government contractor de-
fense outside the military context to products having no sub-
stantial commercial market component. This limitation ensures
that the defense is precisely tailored to protecting the delicate
balance between the individual state's interests in protecting
tort victims and preserving government decision-making
immunity.
146. See supra note 61 (describing Boyle dissent's criticism of the Court's
federal common law analysis).
147. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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